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ABSTRACT 
Techniques described herein provide innovation directed to forming a temporary, 
ad hoc network.  A first node can receive a request to initiate an ad hoc distributed network 
with at least a second node.  A connection with the second node can be initiated based on 
a determination that the second node is an authorized member of the ad hoc distributed 
network in which the determination is based on fulfilling a condition within a smart 
contract that manages membership.  A tunnel can be generated from the first node to the 
second node to send packets to the second node.  Based on an event within a distributed 
ledger of the first node describing shutting down the ad-hoc distributed network, a copy of 
the distributed ledger can be sent to storage and the connection with the second node can 
be shut down. Previously available blockchain systems do not employ abilities to track 
products beyond mere custody information.  
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Many traditional storage systems are centralized storage systems.  In such storage 
systems, one or more servers serve as a central repository that stores information.  The 
central repository is accessible to various client devices.  The central repository is often 
managed by a business entity that typically charges a fee to access the central repository.  
In some instances, there is a transaction fee associated with each transaction.  For example, 
there is often a transaction fee for writing information that pertains to a new transaction, 
and another transaction fee for accessing information related to an old transaction.  As such, 
centralized storage systems tend to be relatively expensive.   
Some centralized storage systems are susceptible to unauthorized data 
manipulation.  For example, in some instances, a malicious actor may gain unauthorized 
access to a central repository and may surreptitiously change information stored in the 
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central repository.  In some scenarios, the unauthorized changes may not be detected.  As 
such, the information stored in a centralized repository is at risk of being inaccurate. 
In a distributed ledger environment (blockchain), the nodes (e.g., network routers 
and other devices) are ‘approved’ members of a blockchain while ‘unapproved’ nodes are 
excluded.    In blockchain parlance, node admission is via Proof of Authority in the smart 
contracts; e.g., the blockchain is hosting a distributed certificate authority that is censorship 
resistance because its policies and actions are automated via the smart contracts running in 
the network.  Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) mesh overlays can implement secure end-
to-end routing and cryptographic message protection.  SSL/VPN meshes are also possible 
in a PKI environment.  With the blockchain, novel new addressability mechanisms arise.  
The concept of building a new blockchain on the fly for a temporary purpose also has 
appealing applications.  Interposing routers (e.g. devices from certain competitors or 
countries, etc.) are oblivious to these networks, which may be persistent or temporary or 
intent-driven.  Figure 1, below, is a schematic diagram of a distributed ledger environment. 
 
Figure 1 
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Background 
Methods and systems are described to locate (geospatial, travel time, jurisdictional, 
etc.) member nodes of a blockchain network and map them across all nodes in the 
blockchain network, with the desirable properties of deterministic, non-interactive 
algorithms such that all of the nodes arrive at the same state conclusion (consensus) in 
parallel.  This is achieved through smart-contract transactions where nodes publish enough 
information as transactions to a blockchain ledger, which is verifiable by all other nodes 
such that they independently compute the same map with ‘pins’ placed on it for nodes.  
This ‘registration’ data set is signed by each node using its public/private key pair 
registered in the blockchain (which can be issued and verified by a distributed certificate 
authority (Dist.CA)). 
Methods and systems can also draw lines between the ‘pins’ (nodes) in which the 
lines may represent tunnel/routing relationships in the network (e.g., IPSec tunnels).  
Tunnel authentication and cryptography will be established using the well-known 
public/private key pairs owned by each respective node as published in the blockchain 
ledger (issued and verified by the Dist.CA).  Embodiments may include Google Maps®, 
Wi-Fi®/Bluetooth® signal triangulation, dynamic network telemetry tested over an 
overlay network, continent, region, locale, number of desired redundant links, etc. 
Methods and systems can include logic in which the network load balances each 
node with a minimum redundant set of routes (high-availability) and a maximum (graph 
degree) and adapts in real-time to transient nodes joining and leaving the mesh. 
Independent copies of this ‘network graph’ can be maintained at each node, which can be 
used (in a predictable consensus manner) in the network control plane for updating routes 
in real-time in the network data plane. General network admission control can be facilitated 
via blockchain contracts (e.g., smart contracts) and leveraging Dist.CA (equivalent to 
network identity). 
To that end, the distributed ledger environment can include one or more source 
nodes (e.g., a first source node, a second source node, and a third source node), one or more 
receiver nodes (e.g., a first receiver node, a second receiver node, and a third receiver node), 
various connecting nodes, and a distributed ledger copied on all the nodes (e.g., source 
nodes, receiver nodes, and connecting nodes).  Briefly, in various implementations, the 
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connecting nodes provide various communication paths between the source nodes and the 
receiver nodes, and each node is configured to adjust at least a portion of the 
communication paths based on their performance.  Figure 2, below, illustrates such a 
distributed ledger environment. 
Figure 2  
During operation, a source node (e.g., the first source node) can initiate a data 
transmission.  In various implementations, a data transmission indicates (e.g., includes) 
information related to a transaction.  In some implementations, the transaction can be 
between a source node and one or more receiver nodes (e.g., between the first source node 
and the second receiver node).   In various implementations, the transaction is recorded in 
the distributed ledger at each node.  As such, in various implementations, the source node 
transmits the data transmission to a receiver node and the ledger records it.  The data 
transmission can include a set of one or more packets, or frames. 
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The connecting nodes can provide communication paths for the data transmission.  
In some implementations, the communication paths include one or more routes that the 
data transmission traverses to reach the receiver node(s).  In some implementations, the 
connecting nodes are connected wirelessly (e.g., via satellite(s), cellular communication, 
Wi-Fi®, etc.) in which the communication paths include wireless communication paths.  
In some implementations, the connecting nodes are connected via wires (e.g., via fiber-
optic cables, Ethernet, etc.) in which the communication paths include wired 
communication paths.  More generally, the communication paths can include wired and/or 
wireless communication paths. 
The distributed ledger can be generated and copied across all nodes to be in 
coordination with each node on the blockchain.  In some implementations, the distributed 
ledger stores transactions.  For example, in some implementations, the distributed ledger 
stores the transaction(s) indicated by the data transmission.  As such, the distributed ledger 
can serve as a record of the transactions that the distributed ledger receives, validates, 
and/or processes.  In some implementations, each node on the blockchain stores a copy 
(e.g., an instance) of the distributed ledger.  As such, in some implementations, there is no 
need for a centralized ledger.    It’s also possible to store the information externally and 
have a cryptographic method which proves the current state of the ledger to the requesting 
node; e.g., a Zero Knowledge Proof of ledger state. 
One or more ledger receiver nodes can receive the data transmission.  In some 
implementations, the various nodes on the blockchain (e.g., source nodes, receiver nodes, 
and connecting nodes) are added to the blockchain and allowed access to the distributed 
ledger based on a consensus determination between the existing nodes on the blockchain.  
For example, a node wishing to join the blockchain can do so in response to receiving 
permission to join from a threshold number/percentage (e.g., a majority) of the existing 
nodes (through a consensus mechanism).  In some implementations, the existing nodes 
compete with each other to authorize the new node and store its associated transactions in 
the distributed ledger.  
The consensus mechanism can be implemented through one or more smart 
contracts which specify whether a node wishing to join the blockchain is allowed to join.  
This details and implements the network Proof of Authority.  In examples, a request is 
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received from a node to join.  Various conditions specified within a smart contract is 
created in accordance with a rule or policy of the smart contract.  If the node fulfills 
conditions in accordance with fulfilling the rule or policy of the smart contract, the node is 
allowed to join the blockchain.  Decentralized status information for the node is updated 
when the smart contract has been fulfilled and read access to the decentralized ledger (and 
its associated status information) is granted to the node. Otherwise, the node is barred from 
joining the blockchain.  Figure 3, below, illustrates an example of nodes being restricted 
from access. 
 
Figure 3 
A source node can transmit a request to set up a communication path (e.g., a secure 
tunnel) to one or more receiver nodes.  In some implementations, the request can indicate 
a quality of service associated with the communication path.  In various implementations, 
the quality of service can indicate: a time duration during which the quality of service is 
applicable; a latency value that indicates an acceptable level of latency (e.g., an acceptable 
transmission time) for data transmissions associated with setting up a tunnel between the 
source node and the receiver node; and/or a priority level associated with data 
transmissions; combinations thereof; and/or the like. 
In some implementations, the blockchain can adjust the performance of at least a 
portion of the communication path(s) between the source node and the receiver node(s) 
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based on a specified security level.  For example, if a node has been barred access to the 
blockchain because it does not fulfill the smart contracts specifying acceptable nodes, then 
the communication path will not go through that node (because it will be unsecure). 
However, if the node has been accepted into the blockchain, then traffic can be routed 
through that node, thus ensuring that only trusted nodes on the blockchain handle traffic. 
In this way, the communication paths remain secure. 
For example, nodes that are accepted or unaccepted in the blockchain can be filtered 
through smart contracts, which control the level or type of traffic that specific nodes on the 
blockchain can view, access, or modify.  For example, the smart contract may specify that 
a node meets the requisite level of security (for traffic with sensitive or proprietary 
information) and may specify that another node does not meet security standards and 
should be restricted from joining the network. 
Various communication paths can be provided by the connecting nodes.  In an 
example, as illustrated in Figure 4 below, there are six connecting nodes that form various 
communication paths.  As noted previously, a communication path can provide a route for 
a data transmission. Consider for the example of Figure 4 that a data transmission from 
source node 20 would like to reach first receiver node 50a.  However, connecting node 40a 
has been deemed untrustworthy and does not fulfil the smart contract for joining or 
remaining on the blockchain.  The data transmission cannot reach the first receiver node 
50 by traveling over communication paths 42a, 42g, and 42i through connecting nodes 40b 
and 40a.  Thus, in this example, the data transmission reaches the first receiver node 50a 
by traveling over communication paths 42a, 42h, 42k and 42l, and through connecting 
nodes 40b, 40d, and 40c.  Further, the data transmission reaches the second receiver node 
50b by traveling over communication paths 42a, 42h, 42k and 42m, and through connecting 
nodes 40b, 40d, and 40c.  Additionally, the data transmission 22 reaches the second 
receiver node 30b by traveling over communication paths 42a, 42h, 42o, and 42t, and 
through connecting nodes 40b, 40d and 40e. 
In some implementations, the blockchain determines the route of the data 
transmission 22 over the communication paths 42 and through the connecting nodes 40 
based on a function of the security of the nodes.  In other words, the blockchain determines 
which connecting nodes 40 and communication paths 42 are to transport the data 
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transmission 22 based on a function of whether the nodes are trusted within the blockchain 
network (e.g., allowed to join) or not. 
Figure 4  
Dynamic Genesis (and Omega) of Transient Network Meshes 
Traditionally, enterprises consider blockchains as being long lived entities that are 
distributed globally and may include thousands of members, each with their ledgers, such 
that the ledger becomes petabytes of storage (e.g., storing millions of transactions).  In 
short, the distributed ledgers have a long history and the blockchain network is a stable 
entity.  But as blockchain networks become dynamic networks (such as flash networks that 
just come-up and then disband on an ad hoc basis for some short term event or some 
specific purpose), there will be a need to quickly synchronize the ledger and provide 
authority to the right nodes to join. 
Genesis is the process by which a blockchain ledger can be birthed.  The blockchain 
can leverage outside mechanisms (such as an administrator in an already existing network, 
such as a blockchain network or other network type) to authenticate and identify nodes 
which wish to come together on demand to form a temporary blockchain. The nodes can 
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then perform distributed key generation to form the Dist.CA and establish the smart 
contract rules based upon adaptive or preconfigured behavioral templates (received by the 
outside mechanisms that created the ad hoc blockchain).  
For example, external authentication mechanisms could look at the birth certificates 
from the actual network devices so that it can be known the device that wants to be admitted 
to the blockchain.  If the device is recognized as a legitimate device, and not a competitor's 
device, the device will be admitted to this temporary network and blockchain is an identity. 
For example, in a trusted infrastructure, hardware chips can be put into the hardware of a 
device at manufacturing.  This can be a very tightly controlled process in which there are 
public private key pairs.  These chips can be created at manufacturing and as they are 
moved out of inventory to suppliers/distributors, their movement and the usage of these 
chips can be very closely guarded and monitored. 
In some implementations, there could be a longer lived blockchain of pre-
established identities that a flash blockchain trusts, similar to a tiered infrastructure where 
all the entities are already pre-registered since they have already gone through some review 
process.  Since they are all trusted entities, flash networks can be established (the longer 
lived blockchain basically acts as an external Authentication Service).  For example, a node 
on the longer lived blockchain can act as a command control and send instructions to the 
devices to form a temporary network.  Based on the blockchain, the devices can act as 
nodes that know who each other are.  This can bring up the ad hoc blockchain network.  In 
some implementations, the nodes can be given rules within a smart contract indicating a 
purpose of the ad hoc blockchain network, how long it should live, the types of entities to 
communicate with, the people/devices that can admit which types of traffic, combinations 
thereof, and/or the like. 
Omega is the process by which a blockchain ledger can undergo permanent cold 
death when the network is no longer needed.  For example, a final transaction can terminate 
a blockchain where all nodes agree to not allow any further transactions.  In some 
implementations, this can be provided as an update to the ledger (e.g., a tombstone at the 
end of the ledger that indicates that no more transactions are permitted beyond on this 
point).  In some implementations, this update may be a state change to the ledger.  For 
example, in such implementations there may be some transactions that come in and all the 
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smart contracts and all the nodes (participating members of the blockchain network) agree 
that the transactions mean the death of the ledger such that it is halted at this point and 
nodes may not do anything further with the ledger except, potentially, operations such as 
read operations. 
In another example, two corporation edge gateways can be directed (by whatever 
external means) to form a temporary relationship (network) to solve some intent on demand. 
They may form a temporary blockchain to capture the relationship and all ensuing activity 
into a cryptographic ledger for future audit and compliance purposes and may leverage the 
other outside mechanisms to automagically construct a viable network configuration that 
achieves the goal. 
The temporary block chain that has been set up is still a cryptographic ledger that 
can be an audit trail of everything that happens while this temporary network is set up.  The 
ledger might be important for audit and compliance and so before the Omega process 
disbands the ad hoc blockchain, the ad hoc blockchain can synchronize the ledger up to a 
longer lived blockchain or other network with cold storage to create a record of the ad-hoc 
blockchain transactions. Thus, the system can tear down the ad hoc blockchain network 
and store whatever is in the ledger to some storage space so that it can be accessed at a 
different time. 
In summary, techniques presented herein provide innovation directed to forming a 
temporary, ad hoc network.  A first node can receive a request to initiate an ad hoc 
distributed network with at least a second node.  A connection with the second node can 
be initiated based on a determination that the second node is an authorized member of the 
ad hoc distributed network in which the determination is based on fulfilling a condition 
within a smart contract that manages membership.  A tunnel can be generated from the first 
node to the second node to send packets to the second node.  Based on an event within a 
distributed ledger of the first node describing shutting down the ad-hoc distributed network, 
a copy of the distributed ledger can be sent to storage and the connection with the second 
node can be shut down. 
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